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A NEW TEST FOR TRADEMARK DILUTION-WHY
NORTH CAROLINA SHOULD ADOPT SECTION 12 OF THE
MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL
"I, Paul, write this greeting in my own hand, which is the distin-
guishing mark in all my letters. This is how I write."
II Thessalonians 3:17 (NIV)
I. INTRODUCTION
Neither history nor theology tell us what was so distinctive
about the apostle Paul's signature, but if he indeed was "the great-
est salesman in the world,"' one can be sure that he understood
the value of a good trademark. No doubt, Paul was concerned that
an imposter's letters would be mistaken for his own and thereby
mislead his intended readers; today, the use of a trademark for
such outright deception is forbidden by both statutory and com-
mon law.'
What if, however, outright deception is not a problem? What
if the promoters of a Caribbean ship line advertised their fare as
"The Greatest Show on Earth"?8 What if a Raleigh plumber began
calling himself "Angus Barn Heating and Air Conditioning"? What
if your dentist promised that his restorative work resulted in
"More Taste... Less Filling"? Two things would happen. First,
the consumer would recognize the "trademark pun"--a play on the
words of a commercial phrase. Second, he or she would not confuse
a cruise with the circus, a heat pump with a restaurant, or a den-
tist with a brewery.
The consumer would recognize the original phrase or mark,
1. 0. MANDINGO, THE GRATEST SALESMAN IN THE WORLD (1980).
2. Use of the trademark for outright deception is called "palming off" or
"passing off." Although these terms can refer to brand substitution by a seller or
infringement without unfair intent, they usually carry the connotation of inten-
tional substitution or outright fraud. See 2 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UN-
PAIR COMPETION §§ 25:1(A), (C). In more formal terms the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1114 (1976) provides civil remedies for trademark infringement; § 1125
provides similar remedies for false designation of origin, false description or
misrepresentation.
3. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Chandris
America Lines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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understand the application to the newer service or product, and
perhaps even appreciate the cleverness with which the newer user
put the old mark to new use. Such are actual and hypothetical ex-
amples of the problem known as trademark dilution. To dilute is
to weaken the force or proper quality of something by mixing it
with something else that tempers or neutralizes it.4 Trademark di-
lution occurs when a party takes another's trademark and uses it
in connection with his own noncompeting product. The result. is a
lessening of the quality and integrity of the trademark and a con-
sequent loss to the trademark owner.
The trademark dilution concept has been around for some
time' and has even gained legal status in the form of Section 12 of
The Model State Trademark Bill:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the
distinctive quality of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark
valid at common law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall
be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of
competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to
the source of goods or services.
This section of the Model State Trademark Bill is now in effect in
twenty-two states, but not in North Carolina."
Unfortunately, no satisfactory definition or set of criteria has
been proposed to distinguish dilution cases from confusion cases,
and some courts continue to insist that the cases cannot be distin-
guished." By way of explanation, a confusion case arises when a
junior user markets his product under a mark or dress similar to
the senior user's mark or dress used on the same or similar prod-
ucts. A "senior" user is the first party to use a particular trade-
mark. Later users are referred to as "junior users." For example,
4. WnaS' R's NzW INTEMNATIONAL DIcTrONARY (2d ed. 1956).
5. Schecter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HAIv. L. REv.
813 (1927), reprinted in 60 TRADE-MARK Rm. 334 (1970).
6. STATz TRADEMARK RzoISOTION (published July 1980 by the United
States Trademark Registration). See also 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 22:5
(1973).
7. 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 24:13.
8. Id. at § 23:15. "Trade dress" is the manner in which manufacturers pack-
age, label and display their products. "If clothes make the man ... trade dress
makes the sale." 1 id. at § 8:1.
9. See generally Weiner King, Inc. v. The Weiner King Corp., 615 F.2d 512
(C.C.P.A. 1980) for a recent discussion of trademark law using terms such as se-
nior party, junior party, prior user and subsequent user.
[Vol. 5:163
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in Illinois an enterprising fast-food restaurant owner used an "M"
resembling McDonald's golden arches to promote his
"Monkburgers" along with the slogan "Less Than 25 Billion
Sold." ° Because of the similarity of goods and marks, the court
decided the case on confusion and discussed dilution as an after-
thought." Similarly, when a publisher who did not own the
SCRABBLE mark sought to market "The Complete SCRABBLE
Dictionary," the court enjoined its publication.1 2 The court empha-
sized its desire to prevent the SCRABBLE mark from becoming
generic, but it could have just as well decided the case on likeli-
hood-of-confusion. The court probably felt that the public would
be easily confused when trying to differentiate between "The Offi-
cial SCRABBLE Player's Dictionary," published by the true owner
of the SCRABBLE mark, and the nonowner's "The Complete
SCRABBLE Dictionary."
This comment will attempt to do three things: provide a useful
definition of dilution; propose a clear test that can be applied to
quickly determine whether, under Section 12 or the common law, a
dilution case exists, and, if so, how it should be decided; and show
why a state such as North Carolina should provide anti-dilution
protection to its citizens.
A. Definition and Evolution
Trademark dilution is a junior party's repetitive use, usually
on noncompetitive goods, of a senior party's strong mark, resulting
in the mark gradually becoming less effective, leaving the senior
party's reputation unprotected and subject to the risks of the jun-
ior party's business. 3 Dilution is not a junior party's attempt to
fool the consumer into believing that he is obtaining the senior
user's product.
10. McDonald's Corp. v. Gunvill, 441 F. Supp 71 (N.D. Ill. 1977), affd, 622
F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1980).
11. Id. at 75.
12. Selchow & Righter Co. v. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 580 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.
1978).
13. "Repetitive," Markel v. Scovill Mfg. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1244 (W.D.N.Y.),
afl'd, 610 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1979); "noncompetitive," Pro-Phy-Lac-Tic Brush Co.
v. Jordan Marsh Co., 165 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1948); "strength," McDonald's Corp.
v. Gunvill, 441 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. 11. 1977), aff'd, 622 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1980);
"effectiveness," Toho Co., Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.
1981); "at risk," Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass.
1964).
19821
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Early in this century, American courts, while realizing that
trademarks deserve protection, emphasized that a mark was a
property right only in conjunction with the goods on which the
owner used the mark."4 Unlike a patent, which can be utilized mo-
nopolistically, defensively, or not used at all,' 5 a trademark's value
grows only out of its use. Consequently, courts have struggled with
the dilution philosophy that the owner of a mark deserves the right
to protect his mark from use by others on a product or service to-
tally unrelated to his own. In other words, if the Eastman Corpora-
tion only used KODAK as its mark on film, cameras, and related
photographic equipment, wouldn't it be monopolistic' to prevent
another from using KODAK as a mark on bicycles?1 7 The advo-
cates of anti-dilution protection argue that it is not monopolistic;
rather, they believe that it is an unfair trade practice to use East-
man's strong mark to mislead the public into thinking that the
party who manufactures high-quality photographic goods also
manufactures bicycles, and presumably bicycles of the same high
quality associated with the KODAK mark.
The consensus today 8 is that in 1927 Frank I. Schecter, a
member of the New York Bar, introduced the dilution concept to
the United States.'9 Schecter, in turn, pointed to a German deci-
sion as the first to recognize the verwiisserung of a trademark. 0
Schecter quite properly noted that the trademark, which had the
historical functions of identification and regulation (originating
with the medieval gild system), now serves to identify and distin-
guish products' natures, qualities and sources, and in turn encour-
ages the public to purchase and repurchase the products.21 Thus,
14. United Drug Co. v. Theordore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Hano-
ver Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976).
16. I.e., should anyone be allowed to monopolize a word in our language and
have a legal right to enforce that monopoly by enjoining others from using that
word?
17. Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. John Griffiths Cycle Corp., 15
Pat. Cas. 105 (Eng. 1898).
18. Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution
Statutes, 44 CAL. L. Rav. 439, 449 (1956); Note, Antidilution Statutes: A New
Attack on Comparative Advertising, 61 BOST. U.L. REv. 220, 222 (1981); Brown,
Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE
L.J. 1165, n.2 (1948).
19. Schecter, supra note 5.
20. Id. at 345-46.
21. Id. at 335.
[Vol. 5:163
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss1/4
TRADEMARK DILUTION
as the function of trademarks changes, the way in which the law
protects the owner's property rights should also change. In
Schecter's words, trademark laws should "reflect a consciousness of
the need for breadth and liberality in coping with the progressive
ingenuity of commercial depravity. ' 2 2 Once a mark functions to
identify a product and encourage its consumption, the uniqueness
of the mark becomes of great importance to its owner.2" Unique-
ness is lost when the mark is used on unrelated goods from a
source other than the mark's true owner. 4
B. Analysis
Why should the owner of a mark receive protection against
another's use of the same or similar mark on different types of
goods, and why should this protection take statutory form? First,
the anti-dilution doctrine is a logical extension of modern equita-
ble principles of tort law:2 5 the ingenious wrongs used to circum-
vent existing law should not go unremedied simply because likeli-
hood-of-confusion is the leading traditional test. Second, the courts
and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office both deny anti-dilution
relief under the Lanham Act.2 6 Third, absent anti-dilution protec-
tion, the owner of a mark has no protection against generic use of
his mark by authors and publishers among others.'7 Finally, courts
22. Id. at 334; in other words, as in many areas of the law, the infringers will
always try to keep one step ahead of current enforcement. Consequently, the law
ought to be ready to keep in close pursuit.
23. Id. at 339.
24. Id. at 345.
25. Derenberg, supra note 18. "There remains a body of law which is di-
rected toward the compensation of individuals, rather than the public, for losses
which they have suffered in respect of their legally recognized interests, rather
than one only, where the law considers that compensation is required. This is the
law of torts." W. Paossaa, HANDBOOK OF Tmz LAw OF TORTS § 1 (4th ed. 1971).
"The trader has not a free lance. Fight he may, but as a soldier, not as guerilla."
Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 260, 69 N.E. 1085, 1087 (1904).
26. 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:13(F). The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1051 (1976) does not define dilution nor does it provide a remedy for the use of
another's trademark on noncompeting products. The only remedies provided are
for use of marks "likely to cause confusion," and as stated herein, confusion is not
the root of the dilution injury.
27. 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 12:9. For example in criminal cases,
judges and policemen often refer to suspects wearing "levis" when they mean bluejeans, dungarees or something similar; e.g. United States v. Farese, 612 F.2d 1376,
1382 (5th Cir. 1980). As some laymen already know, constant generic use of a
trademark can result in the original owner's loss of federal and common-law
1982]
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and advocates need guidance to a proper application of the doc-
trine. Otherwise, it will disappear and certain forms of unfair com-
petition will proliferate in its absence.
Those who argue that the anti-dilution doctrine provides too
much protection point out that the supply of good marks is lim-
ited, and the owner of a mark should not be entitled to monopolize
his mark outside his own field of goods. Nevertheless, the reasons
offered for and against anti-dilution protection can be reconciled
by a test that quickly and properly identifies the criteria that
should exist before anti-dilution protection is granted.
Most trademark protection results not from any application of
anti-dilution theory, but rather from the "likelihood of confusion"
tests.28 The various tests for likelihood-of-confusion are designed
to aid a court in deciding whether "an appreciable number of rea-
sonable buyers are likely to be confused by similar marks."' 9 Like-
lihood-of-confusion cases usually present more obvious questions
of theft than do dilution cases. When the owner of a mark asks for
protection from likelihood of confusion, he asks that some other
user be precluded from presenting a similar product to the public
in a manner that leads them to believe it is the first owner's prod-
uct (when in reality it is not), resulting in the second user diverting
sales from the first owner. In more recent cases, where goods may
not be directly competitive, courts have used the following factors
rights in the trademark. 1 J. MCCARTHY § 20:15(B). But where does a right of
action lie against a judge or policeman or any other author who uses a registered
trademark as a generic term in a written opinion, report or work of art?
28. 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 23:1-19. Section 729 of the first Re-
statement of Torts lists some of the appropriate factors used to determine
whether trademarks are confusingly similar:
In determining whether the actor's designation is confusingly similar
to the other's trade-mark or trade name, the following factors are
important:
(a) the degree of similarity between the designation and the trade
name in
(i) appearance;
(ii) pronunciation of the words used;
(iii) verbal translation of the pictures or designs involved;
(iv) suggestion;
(b) the intent of the actor in adopting the designation;
(c) the relation in use and manner and marketing between the
goods or services marketed by the actor and those marketed by the
other;
(d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers.
29. 2 J. McCAwnf, supra note 2, § 23:1.
[Vol. 5:163
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to test whether confusion-type trademark infringement has taken
place: strength of the prior user's mark; similarity of the products
and the channels of trade through which they are merchandized;
the possibility that the senior user will "bridge the gap" by mar-
keting products similar to those of the junior user; any evidence of
actual confusion; the quality of defendant's product; the sophisti-
cation of the likely consumers; and any other factors that may be
relevant to the particular case. 80
On the other hand, a dilution complaint does not (or at least
should not) concern itself with whether the public is confused as to
the source of similar goods, but rather with whether a second
user's appropriation of the first user's mark for some unrelated
product makes the mark less unique than it once was, resulting in
a long-term weakening of the mark. No sales are immediately di-
verted from the first user, but over time, the public's perception of
the second user's product will mingle with its perception of the
first user's product. If the second user's product (or service) is of
lesser quality than the first user's, the public will eventually con-
nect the taint of lesser quality with the first user. It is this connec-
tion with a product over which he has no control that the first user
seeks to avoid when asking for anti-dilution protection.
C. Factors Present in Dilution Cases
The number of true dilution cases which have been properly
decided are rare, and the leading cases are cited repeatedly and are
discussed in Section II herein. The following tests for dilution are
presented in hopes of providing more convenient benchmarks than
courts have thus far furnished when applying anti-dilution statutes
and common law concepts. Each case must be decided on its own
facts, and no one factor should turn a case toward or away from a
dilution decision. Nevertheless, the following factors are those
most frequently mentioned by courts and commentators: (1)
strength of plaintiff's mark," (2) use of the mark on noncompeti-
tive goods,3 (3) likelihood of immediate injury to plaintiff,33 (4)
30. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp:, 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden Inc., 644 F.2d 960 (2d Cir.
1981); Buitoni Foods Corp. v. Gio. Buton & C. S.p.A., 680 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1982);
Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph International Corp., 308 F.2d 196 (2d
Cir. 1962).
31. 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:14.
32. Id. at § 24:13.
19821
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debilitation of distinctiveness of the mark,3 ' (5) plaintiff's own di-
lution of his mark," (6) the difference in quality between plaintiff's
and defendant's goods, 6 and (7) the probability that the public
will believe the different goods come from the same or a related
source. 7 When properly decided dilution cases are analyzed, at
least five of these seven factors exist-although not always the
same five-in a manner indicating that dilution relief is appropri-
ate. Thus, the presence of five of these factors is a valid threshold
when considering whether antidilution remedies ought to be
applied.
1. Strength
In order for a plaintiff to be entitled to anti-dilution protec-
tion, he must have a mark strong enough to be diluted.3 8 The
strength of a mark is in its message, its ability to identify and dis-
tinguish a product as originating from one particular source, re-
gardless of whether the consumer knows what that source actually
is.39 Leading cases recognize POLAROID, 0 TIFFANY,"1 and
ROLLS ROYCE42 as examples of strong marks prone to dilution.
Weaker marks such as "HOLIDAY" receive less protection, al-
though a strong secondary meaning 3 (i.e., HOLIDAY INN) weighs
in favor of some anti-dilution protection."
A trademark's strength is often determined by the category
33. 3 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 84:2 (3d ed. 1969).
34. Id.
35. Philip Morris Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
289 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
36. 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 33, § 84.2.
37. 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:14.
38. Id.
39. Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 532 F. Supp. 1203
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
40. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics, 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
41. Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964).
42. Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, Inc., 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925).
43. An otherwise nondistinctive trademark acquires secondary meaning
when a mental association exists in the minds of buyers between the trademark
and a single source of product to which it is attached. 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note
2, § 15:2.
44. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out In America, 481 F.2d 445 (5th Cir.
1973).
[Vol. 5:163
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into which it falls. In order of increasing strength, marks and des-
ignations used on products are either generic ("CORN" on canned
corn), descriptive ("FRUIT CHEWS" on candy), suggestive
("HOLIDAY INN" on a motel), arbitrary ("TAB" on a soft drink),
or fanciful ("EXXON" on gasoline, oil, etc.).4 Fanciful marks al-
ways deserve anti-dilution protection; such coined marks have no
meaning outside the commercial sphere so there is absolutely no
reason for a second user to adopt a prior user's fanciful mark ex-
cept to trade on the prior user's success. Arbitrary marks deserve
almost as much protection, but some room should be left for a jun-
ior user; e.g., any food item with the mark TAB would likely be
connected with the soft drink. Because "tab" is a dictionary word,
however, something from an office supply store could bear the
same mark without producing either confusion or dilution. Sugges-
tive marks can also be diluted. They require no secondary meaning
for likelihood-of-confusion protection and should require none for
dilution protection although, as is the case for arbitrary marks,
protection ought not to extend as far as it does for fanciful marks.
Any clear line to be drawn between marks for purposes of anti-
dilution protection should be drawn between suggestive and de-
scriptive marks. That is, descriptive marks deserve no dilution pro-
tection absent secondary meaning (if then), and as reflected in the
common and statutory law, generic marks or designations are of no
trademark significance and deserve no protection from either con-
fusion or dilution."
2. Use on Noncompetitive Goods
If similar marks are used on competitive goods, protection
normally arises from the likelihood-of-confusion tests. This is not
to say that confusion and dilution cannot exist under the same set
of facts,47 but rather to suggest that use on noncompetitive goods
45. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 11:1-24. A fancilful mark is a word
coined expressly for the purpose of becoming a trademark. Id. at § 11:2. An arbi-
trary mark is a dictionary word arbitrarily applied to a product of which the word
is neither descriptive nor suggestive. Id. A descriptive mark reflects a purpose,
function, use, size, or characteristic of the goods to which it is attached. Id. at §
11:5. Suggestive marks elude easy description, but are said to occupy the middle
ground between arbitrary and descriptive marks. Id. at § 11:20. Generic marks,
which merely define the goods to which they are attached, have no trademark
significance.
46. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 11:1-2.
47. McDonald's Corp. v. Gunvill, 441 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ill. 1977), aff'd, 622
19821
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should be a red flag to the court to consider a possible dilution
problem. Again, the dilution worry is not that a consumer will be
misled and make an immediate "wrong" purchase, but instead that
over a period of time the prior user's mark will lose some of its
distinctiveness precisely because of its use on totally different
goods."8 As one commentator points out, competitive repercussions
can follow even when the relationship between the senior and jun-
ior users is noncompetitive.""
3. Lack of Immediate Injury
Almost identical considerations dictate that a lack of the like-
lihood of immediate injury to the prior user should encourage dilu-
tion analysis. If the prior user is unlikely to suffer immediate in-
jury, it is because the public is unlikely to be confused. As stated
above, however, this is precisely the time that dilution analysis
should control. Immediate loss of sales does not worry the dilution
plaintiff; his concern is whether his mark will still mean as much
after the defendant has applied the mark to goods over which the
plaintiff has no control. Lack of immediate injury may be the end
of confusion analysis, but it should mark the beginning of dilution
analysis.
4. Debilitation of Distinctiveness
Debilitation of distinctiveness is related in logic to strength of
the mark; a nondistinctive mark has no distinctiveness to lose. A
strong mark, however, may not be distinctive. As an example, the
Fifth Circuit recently denied Amstar Corporation's (DOMINO
sugar) request for an injunction of Domino's Pizza, Inc.'s use of
Domino as a mark for pizza.50 The court found the mark strong in
the bulks1 and portioned sugar product areas, but weak outside of
those categories.52 The mark was strong enough to be protected
within certain classifications, but not distinctive enough to be pro-
tected elsewhere. In another leading case, 3 a court conceded that
F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1980).
48. 2 J. McCArTHY, supra note 2, § 24:13.
49. 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 33, § 84.2.
50. Id. at § 84.2(a).
51. Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc. 615 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
52. Id. at 265.
53. G.B. Kent & Sons, Ltd. v. P. Lorrilard Co., 114 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y.
[Vol. 5:163
10
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss1/4
TRADEMARK DILUTION
the mark KENT was strong in one class of goods (brushes), but
not distinctive enough to be protected from use in other areas by
other parties. Thus, the distinctiveness of a trademark or trade
name must be considered in addition to its strength in one or sev-
eral areas of the marketplace.
5. Owner's Self-Dilution
A trademark owner can actually dilute his own mark, and such
an owner deserves correspondingly less dilution protection. An
owner can dilute his mark in one of two ways: improper use and
too frequent use. The first category would occur if, for example,
Xerox Corporation began using XEROX as a noun or verb (as Sen-
ator Sam Ervin did in the Watergate hearings)" and dropped the
words "photocopier" or "photocopy" from its advertising and the
like. Under such circumstances, the company would not be entitled
to protection from dilution resulting from its own misuse. The sec-
ond type of self-dilution is more subtle and manufacturers often
feel they are using it to their advantage when in reality they are
not. This is the use of an established mark on a new, related prod-
uct and is known as "line-extension." 55 Line-extension trades on
the existing goodwill of an established mark. There is a risk that
the new products might detract from the favorable image of the
products originally using the mark. The following are examples
from the cigarette industry:" MARLBORO, MARLBORO 100's,
Menthol MARLBORO, and MARLBORO LIGHTS. A plaintiff so
diluting its own mark is entitled to less protection than one who
does not.
Self-dilution can be avoided by using "brand management," a
theory used by one of the major manufacturers of personal and
household care goods.5" Each different product is given its own
prominently displayed trade name, with the manufacturer's name
discretely added. The advantage is two-fold: First, successful prod-
1953).
54. Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in
the Market Place, 64 TRADE-MARK RE. 75 (1974); see p. 80 n.2: "[To me] any
copy of anything is a Xerox copy."
55. Philip Morris Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
289 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 485 F.
Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1980).
56. 188 U.S.P.Q. at 291.
57. 485 F. Supp. 1185 at 1199. For example, SURE, IVORY, and PRELL
are all "brand management" trademarks of Proctor & Gamble.
1982]
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ucts develop strong, well-recognized names; and second, unsuccess-
ful products tarnish only their own marks and do not adversely
affect either the manufacturer's mark or the marks of his other
products.58 One more example: PEPSI, DIET PEPSI, and PEPSI
LIGHT are three different soft drinks using the same mark. Conse-
quently, the mark-although, no doubt, one of the strongest in the
world-cannot be as strong as if it were used on only one soft
drink. Recently, the Coca-Cola Company has taken this same
plunge: on Thursday, July 8, 1982, Coca-Cola introduced DIET
COKE and announced a 50 million dollar marketing campaign to
promote the product. DIET COKE is only the second product to
carry the COKE trademark. 9
6. Difference in Quality
Anti-dilution protection should be granted when there is a
large difference in quality between plaintiff's and defendant's
goods. Plaintiff's goods must be of a higher quality and defendant's
use of plaintiff's mark must tarnish it. If defendant's use "pol-
ishes" plaintiff's mark, grounds for dilution protection are soft. For
example, Sears, Roebuck used the mark BAGZILLA along with a
lizard-like character to mark a line of heavy-duty trash bags. The
court refused to enjoin Sears as requested by the owners of the
character GODZILLA. While the court did not take the "polish-
ing" approach, one could argue that although "GODZILLA" is a
strong mark in that many persons would recognize it and what it
stood for, SEARS is also a strong mark and connotes high quality
in the household products areas. A good mark is not diluted when
imitated or related to another good mark." In short, Sears' appro-
priation of the suffix "-zilla" and the lizard motif to describe a high
quality, presumably tough trash bag did not reflect badly on the
GODZILLA mark, and may have enhanced it. In a similar case, the
owners of the mark SHIP SHAPE-used on their comb and brush
cleaner-tried to enjoin the owners of the OLD SPICE mark from
using SHIP SHAPE as a mark for OLD SPICE hair spray. 1 The
trial and appellate courts denied plaintiff relief, mainly on the
grounds that there was no likely confusion. But the courts, in dis-
58. Id.
59. Associated Press, July 8, 1982: The Washington Post, July 8, 1982 at p.
1; The Christian Science Monitor, July 27, 1982 at 1.
60. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:14.
61. King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 454 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1972).
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missing any dilution arguments, pointed out that the OLD SPICE
mark produced high esteem in the marketplace and thus the OLD
SPICE-SHIP SHAPE combination did not injure plaintiff's busi-
ness reputation. Other courts have decided that association with
names such as R.J. REYNOLDS 62 or COLGATE-PALMOLIVE 3
could not harm the image of another party's product.
7. Public Perception of Related Sources
The last factor in the test is the possibility that the public will
be led to believe that plaintiff's and defendant's goods both origi-
nate from a related source. If the public is likely to assume that
the goods come from different sources, the court should evaluate
the need for dilution protection. This seems backwards but in real-
ity parallels the other factors. If the public believes that both sets
of goods come from a related source, then plaintiff is entitled to
confusion protection (e.g., defendant should not be allowed to try
to convince the public that his product is connected with plaintiff's
similar product). When, however, the public is likely to recognize
that plaintiff's and defendant's goods do not come from related
sources, confusion is not a problem, but dilution may be. Again,
the rationale is that dilution causes a slower, more subtle change in
the public's perception of plaintiff's mark. If this perception of
plaintiff's mark changes for the worse, the public's knowledge that
the source of defendant's goods are unrelated to the source of
plaintiff's goods becomes immaterial.
Factors favoring dilution protection have been summarized
and compared to factors favoring the likelihood-of-confusion tests
in Table I.
62. 188 U.S.P.Q. 289.
63. Cue Publishing Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 144 U.S.P.Q. 371 (BNA)
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd, 23 A.D.2d 289, 259 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. 1965).
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Table I
Dilution and Confusion Factors
FAVORING FAVORING
DILUTION LIKELIHOOD-
PROTECTION OF-CONFUSION
Character of Strong Strong or Weak
Plaintiff's Mark
Competitive Goods No Yes
Likelihood of Immediate No Yes
Injury
Debiliation of Yes No
Distinctiveness
Plaintiff's Own Dilution No Yes or No
Difference in Quality Large Large or Small
Possibility of Related No Yes
Source
This test provides a fast, relatively simple gauge of the factors
present when dilution is a problem and when section 12 should be
applied. A majority of cases can be reconciled by applying the test
to each peculiar fact situation.
II. PROPER USE OF THE DILUTION DOCTRINE
A. Early Developments
Over 50 years ago, the Supreme Court expressly stated that
outside of the user's business a trademark had no property value
and deserved no protection." Had such a viewpoint prevailed,
there would be no such thing as dilution doctrine. Fortunately,
other courts were already recognizing something of value in a
trademark outside of its worth within a given classification of
goods and were also recognizing that this "something" was more
worthy of protection in strong marks than in weak ones." In 1925
the Third Circuit, straining to connect "aeroplanes," automobiles,
and radio tubes, so as to find the requisite confusion, decided to
use electricity as the glue." This attempt led to an early expression
64. American Steel Foundaries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926).
65. Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928); Wall v.
Rolls-Royce of America, Inc., 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925).
66. France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., 7 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1925).
67. 4 F.2d at 334.
[Vol. 5:163
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss1/4
TRADEMARK DILUTION
of the dilution concept: if a radio tube manufacturer used the
name ROLLS-ROYCE on radio tubes of poor quality, the result
could be an undermining and distrust of the trade name of the
famous automobile manufacturer even if purchasers were not con-
fused. 68 Judge Learned Hand came to a similar conclusion in
1928,69 while deciding a dispute between the manufacturers of
YALE hardware and those of YALE flashlights and batteries.
Judge Hand recognized the mark owner's economic interest in the
use of the mark outside of his own field, a key concept in dilution
(use on noncompetitive goods).10 Likewise, Judge Hand recognized
that the mark carried the owner's name for better or worse and
that "another can use it only as a mask."'7' By 1942 the Supreme
Court, through Justice Frankfurter, recognized the symbolic and
psychological values of a mark apart from its identification value.
"If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true we purchase
goods by them. 7"
Using similar logic, the Ninth Circuit in 1948 enjoined a San
Francisco tavern from using the paine "STORK CLUB" even
though geography and clientele precluded direct competition or
confusion with the famous New York restaurant. 7" The court held
that the result of the junior user trading on the senior user's repu-
tation and goodwill was enough to support relief regardless of the
junior user's original object in selecting the mark.74 The court used
another dilution concept when it noted that equity gives greater
protection to stronger marks than it does to weaker ones. 8
Schecter's proposal for anti-dilution protection came in 1927;76
the Model State Trademark Bill was prepared in 194917 and was
amended to include an anti-dilution provision in 1964.'0 While
some courts have struggled with, misused, and even resisted the
68. Id.
69. 26 F.2d at 972.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205 (1942).
73. Stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948).
74. Id. at 355.
75. Id; 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:14.
76. Schecter, supra note 5.
77. MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL, The United States Trademark Associa-
tion, 6 East 45th Street, New York, New York 10017; 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note
2, § 22:3.
78. 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 12.
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concept, 9 others have correctly applied it. 80 Any test for deciding
when anti-dilution protection is to be extended must give correct
results in properly decided cases.
B. Proper Use of the Dilution Doctrine in Granting Relief
In 1962 the Fifth Circuit granted anti-dilution protection
without mentioning the term.81 A chemical company took advan-
tage of a popular beer slogan, "Where There's Life . . . There's
BUD, 82 by advertising its insecticide under the slogan, "Where
There's Life . . .There's Bugs." The defendant claimed no unfair
competition could exist absent competition between beer and in-
secticide and thus no injunction against the slogan's use could is-
sue. The court rejected defendant's argument, taking cognizance of
"the basic unfairness of the commercial world," noting that a trade
name could be damaged on grounds totally separate from actual
confusion, and pointing out that if defendant was allowed to con-
tinue using the slogan plaintiff would be subjected to the hazards
of defendant's business practtces and fortunes.83
This case arose before promulgation of Section 12, but still
captures two key elements of a dilution claim: damage to a mark
absent likelihood-of-confvsion and exposure of one party's reputa-
tion to an unrelated party's method of doing business. Consider
the results under the proposed test to construe Section 12: the
BUD mark (slogan) was strong (promoted by over $40,000,000 in
advertising);84 the goods were noncompetitive; plaintiff expected
no immediate injury, but the slogan lost some of its distinctiveness
every time defendant used his slogan. BUD was not a self-diluted
mark, and few consumers would likely expect that the beer and the
insecticide came from the same source. Finally, regardless of the
possible high quality of the insecticide, the connotation of insects
related badly to a food product. The test leads to the correct con-
clusion-defendant was forced to discontinue his use of the offend-
ing slogan.8 5
79. Id. at § 24:13.
80. Id.
81. Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Bush, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 437-38.
84. Id. at 434.
85. Id. at 439.
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In 1963 the Polaroid Corporation sued an Illinois manufac-
turer of heating and refrigeration systems for use of the trade
name POLARAID. 86 Polaroid made its anti-dilution claim under
an Illinois law worded similarly to Section 12.11 The court granted
the injunction, calling POLAROID an outstanding example of a
.strong, coined, and famous mark representing products of high
quality,88 and noting that proof of competition between the parties
was not required. 89 The court went so far as to find that, in spite of
many available names, defendant had purposely chosen one as
close as possible to plaintiff's."0 The proposed analysis reaches the
identical result: The senior user's mark was strong (coined and
fanciful); the goods in question were noncompetitive; there was no
likelihood of immediate injury; a loss of distinctiveness was even-
tually likely to result; Polaroid had not diluted its own mark; and
there was little possibility that a purchaser would assume the
goods originated from related sources. The facts did not indicate
the difference in quality between the goods of Polaroid and those
of Polaraid, but any disparity in Polaroid's favor would have
strengthened its anti-dilution claim.
The next leading case arose in 196491 when "TIFFANY's," a
Boston restaurant, was sued by the owners of the well-known New
York jewelry store. In granting relief under the Massachusetts
anti-dilution statute, 2 the court noted defendant's attempt to
86. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963).
87. Id. at 832; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140 § 22 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
Every person, association, or union of workingmen adopting and us-
ing a mark, trade name, label or form of advertisement may proceed by
suit, and all courts having jurisdiction thereof shall grant injunctions, to
enjoin subsequent use by another of the same or any similar mark, trade
name, label or form of advertisement if there exists a likelihood of injury
to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark, trade name, label, or form of advertisement of the prior user, not-
withstanding the absence of competition between the parties or of confu-
sion as to the source of goods or services; except that the provisions of
this section shall not deprive any party of any vested lawful rights ac-
quired prior to the effective date of this Act.
88. Id. at 832-33.
89. Id. at 835.
90. Id.
91. Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964).
92. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 110B, § 7A (West 1975). Chapter 110, section
7A has been repealed and replaced by Chapter 110B, § 12, which is a verbatim
adoption of Section 12 of the Model State Trademark Bill; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 110B, § 12 (West 1975).
19821 179
17
Summa: A New Test for Trademark Dilution - Why North Carolina Should Ado
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1982
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
"hitch-hike"' 3 on the TIFFANY name even though confusion of
customers was an unlikely possibility.4 This result is compatible
with the proposed test: TIFFANY is a strong mark; the goods were
noncompetitive; the jewelry store would suffer little, if any, imme-
diate injury; Tiffany's had not diluted its own name; there eventu-
ally developed a large disparity in the goods offered by plaintiff
and defendant;95 and there was little possibility that each user's
goods came from the same source.
C. Proper Use of the Dilution Doctrine in Denying Relief
If a plaintiff alleges dilution when in reality none has occurred,
a proper application of the dilution doctrine (and the test) should
result in a denial of relief, as the following cases illustrate. In 1973
the owners of the well-known motel chain "HOLIDAY INN" sued
to enjoin the owner of a campground business from using the
names "Holiday Out," "Holiday Out in America," and "The Na-
tion's Campground. '"" The court concluded that there was no need
for dilution analysis, properly noting that the doctrine is more ap-
plicable to noncompetitive goods unlikely to confuse the public.' 7
The mark "HOLIDAY INN" is suggestive and relatively strong.
However, the word "Holiday" is weak by itself and thus has little
distinctive quality that can be eroded. The goods are borderline
non-competitive-they both offer lodging to travelers, but persons
seeking motel space are probably not seeking campground space
and vice versa. Holiday Inns, Inc., is generally regarded as a high-
quality business, but the difference in quality from defendant's
campgrounds is not apparent; i.e., a high-quality campground
would not detract from the connotations of anyone's "Holiday"
mark. Finally, since Holiday Inns, Inc., had itself entered the
campground business,98 the analysis should have proceeded under
the confusion doctrine. The main factor precluding anti-dilution
relief is the name "Holiday." Had the plaintiff's mark been more
unique, the scales might have tipped in its favor.
93. 231 F. Supp. at 842.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 843.
96. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out In America, 481 F.2d 445 (5th Cir.
1973).
97. Id. at 450.
98. Id. at 446. ("Holiday Inn Trav-L-Park").
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As cited earlier,99 the Ninth Circuit allowed Sears, Roebuck &
Company to continue its use of the mark "BAGZILLA" along with
a cartoon of a reptile on its packing of trash bags.' 00 Toho Co.,
Ltd., of Japan sued to enjoin such use, claiming infringement on
its mark GODZILLA, the lizardlike monster found in movies, tele-
vision, comic books, and the like. ' The court decided that
GODZILLA's image had not been impaired, nor had Sears linked
the character with anything unsavory or degrading." 2 This case
perhaps best illustrates the point that where defendant's name and
goods are of high quality, plaintiff will have a harder time claiming
that his mark was tarnished. 0 3 Also weighing against application
of anti-dilution relief was Sears' use of the generic term "bag" as
part of its name. Besides being dissimilar to plaintiff's mark's first
syllable, a generic mark is the weakest of all possible categories.1'0
It would be inconsistent to claim that such a weak mark could tar-
nish GODZILLA while maintaining that GODZILLA itself was
strong enough to be diluted.
III. IMPROPER DISCUSSION OR APPLICATION OF THE DILUTION
DOCTRINE
Notwithstanding the straightforward language of Section 12 of
the Model State Trademark Bill 05-the anti-dilution provision
now in effect in 22 states' 06-many courts refuse to apply it as
written and passed by legislatures, insisting instead on the likeli-
hood-of-confusion or unfair intent before granting anti-dilution re-
lief.107 Of course, the dilution concept becomes substantially
worthless if it is only applied when the likelihood of confusion or
some other element of unfair competition already exists.
In particular the New York state and federal courts have
spent the last few years wavering over the doctrine. For example,
in 1977 in Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical
99. See supra text p. 12.
100. Toho Co. Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 793.
103. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:14B.
104. 1 id. at §§ 11:1-14.
105. MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL, supra note 77.
106. STATE TRADEMARK REGISTRATION, United States Trademark Associa-
tion, supra note 6.
107. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:13.
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Trades' 0 the New York Court of Appeals correctly outlined the
doctrine, noting that anti-dilution relief was a different sort of pro-
tection than that offered under the infringement tests, that the evil
of dilution did not lie in any likelihood of public confusion, and
that the New York statute specifically provided for injunctive re-
lief notwithstanding the absence of confusion.109 Some federal
courts have acknowledged this view of dilution,"' but another has
cited Allied's interpretation of dilution as "dictum""' and a very
recent case deems it to be "contrary to the weight of state and
federal authority."' 1 2 Yet another New York federal case regresses
and relies completely on the dilution-requires-confusion view of
the doctrine." 3
Part of the disorder over the correct application probably is
due to the type of cases that have arisen. Most of the cases which
cite and agree with Allied have denied relief, and Allied itself held
the name "Allied" to be nondistinctive and unworthy of confusion
or dilution protection." One case that claimed to grant dilution
protection probably did not; the names at issue were "American
Optical" and "North American Optical" and both users dealt in
optical products." 6 Under most tests, including the one proposed
108. Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d
538, 369 N.E.2d 1162, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1977).
109. 399 N.Y.S.2d at 630-31, 369 N.E.2d at 1164-65.
110. "Even if plaintiff had not established a likelihood of confusion, it
would be entitled to relief under New York General Business Law § 368-d .... "
Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 n.8 (2d
Cir. 1979). "The parties need not be competitors, nor need there be any showing
of confusion." American Optical Corp. v. North American Optical Corp., 489 F.
Supp. 443, 451 (N.D.N.Y. 1979). "(L)ikelihood of confusion or competition need
not be shown. . . ." Saratoga Vichy Springs Co. v. Lehman, 491 F. Supp. 141, 156
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Martellito v. Nina of California, 335 F. Supp. 1288
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
111. "(T)his statement was uttered in dictum and hence cannot be said to
have changed the decisional law of New York State ... " Mushroom Makers Inc.
v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1978).
112. Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 532 F. Supp. 1203,
1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). This paper does not purport to examine such a statement
in light of the Erie doctrine.
113. "(A)s plaintiffs cannot show a likelihood of confusion, their claim
under Section 368-d of the New York General Business Law must also fail."
Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, 530 F. Supp. 1187, 1198
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
114. 42 N.Y.2d 538, 546, 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1166, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628, 633.
115. 489 F. Supp. 443, 451.
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herein, this case should have been dealt with on confusion grounds.
It shed little, if any, light on present trends in the dilution doc-
trine. Other cases construing the statute are trademark licensor-
licensee disputes rather than true dilution situations.116
In order to understand the present uncertainty in the doc-
trine's application the sources of that uncertainty need to be ex-
amined more closely. Once the underlying reasons for misuse are
recognized such misuse should be eliminated and replaced with
proper regard for the rights of prior users, junior users and the
public.
The leading cases on dilution trace the path of the doctrine
from present times to the 1920s, repeating over and over the
phrases found in litigation in 1969 (ALLSTATE),1 7  1965
(CUE),118 (ESQUIRE),"19 1953 (KENT),20 and finally finding ha-
ven in Judge Learned Hand's dicta in 1928 (YALE).' The irony
of using Judge Hand's words is apparent when one realizes his de-
cision was an early opinion espousing dilution-type protection; yet
today this decision is blindly followed to bolster poor interpreta-
tions of dilution philosophy. Furthermore, the recent decisions ig-
nore a strength of the common law-the ability of the legislature
to change it. In short, even if the pre-anti-dilution-legislation com-
mon law provided no anti-dilution protection, legislative adoption
of specific anti-dilution laws-conspicuous in their insistence that
likelihood-of-confusion need not be found concurrently with dilu-
tion-should have required the courts to adopt this new view of
trademark protection. Pre-anti-dilution statute case law should not
govern post-statutory decisions in states adopting Section 12 of the
Model Bill. New York adopted its own version of Section 12 in
1961.111 New York courts are confusing a viable doctrine; even in
cases where anti-dilution protection is properly denied, the courts
116. Bowmar Instrument Corp. v. Continental Microsystems Inc., 497 F.
Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
117. Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Allstate Driving School, 301 F. Supp. 4
(E.D.N.Y. 1969).
118. Cue Publishing Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 144 U.S.P.Q. 371 (BNA)
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
119. Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 109 U.S.P.Q. 30 (BNA) (D.
Mass. 1956).
120. G.B. Kent & Sons, Ltd. v. P. LorriUard, 114 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y.
1953).
121. Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
122. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW, § 368-d (McKinney 1968).
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often insert a paragraph misstating the law, sometimes noting that
the misstatement flies in the face of the statutory language.123
Today's courts also ignore another probable reason behind
early case law's consistent finding of confusion or unfair intent
whenever dilution was found. Lacking any concept of dilution, the
judge sitting as chancellor, seeking to do equity in the face of a
type of unfair competition not easily categorized in the terms of
his day, would likely do two things: first, rule in favor of the party
deserving protection because equity compelled him to, and second,
fit his decision into the recognized pigeonholes of likelihood-of-
confusion and unfair intent even though these traditional catego-
ries did not really describe the wrong he perceived. This is a good
explanation of why early dilution cases always latched on to confu-
sion as well-the judge sought to fashion a remedy for the deserv-
ing party while doing so within the framework of stare decisis.
Courts should recognize this, and likewise recognize the contribu-
tion of the commentators in defining this new remedy. Today's
courts should not use the older decisions connecting confusion and
dilution without realistically examining why they came to be con-
nected in the first place. Legislative definition of a new concept
frees courts from using inappropriate concepts from previous deci-
sions of courts that did not have the new concept available as an
alternative.
Use of the proposed test provides courts with the opportunity
to properly dismiss spurious anti-dilution claims without giving
improper advisory opinions as to when it deserves use.
When the proposed five-of-seven-factors test is applied to four
of the leading New York cases, 2 " which are often cited nationwide,
the same results are achieved as were achieved in those cases, and
are achieved without misapplying the dilution doctrine or render-
ing unnecessary advisory opinions. The advantages of the test are
its ability to show plaintiffs why their dilution claim fails, its easy
123. "(T)he New York Court of Appeals stated that it was not necessary to
prove confusion between the marks in order to prevail under Section 368-d. How-
ever, the Second Circuit has characterized this statement as dictum and 'contrary
to the weight of state and federal authority. . . ."' Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultra-
cashmere House, Ltd., 532 F. Supp. 1203, 1221 (S.D.N.Y.,1982).
124. Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Allstate Driving School, 301 F. Supp. 4
(E.D.N.Y. 1969); Cue Publishing Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 144 U.S.P.Q. 371
(BNA) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 109
U.S.P.Q. 30 (BNA) (D. Mass. 1956); G.B. Kent & Sons, Ltd. v. P. Lorillard, 114 F.
Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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framework for a court to apply when denying relief, its preserva-
tion of anti-dilution protection as a viable doctrine, and most im-
portantly, its provision of protection to those who legitimately de-
serve it.
1. Cue Publishing v. Colgate-Palmolive
A case often cited as supporting the "dilution-requires-confu-
sion" error arose when the publishers of a New York night-life
magazine CUE sued to enjoin the Colgate-Palmolive Company
from marketing a toothpaste under the same name.2 5 In denying
the injunction, the court found no evidence of fraud, "palming off"
or actual confusion or mistake.""6 The court correctly held that the
dilution doctrine did not apply, but while so holding, misinter-
preted the statute, stating that confusion was required before dilu-
tion could be found. 127 The proposed test reaches the same proper
result while avoiding misstatement. Briefly, CUE is a weak mark, a
dictionary word, as the court so found. 2 ' The goods are noncom-
petitive with no likelihood of immediate injury and no line exten-
sion by plaintiff. But in addition to the weak mark, the high quali-
ty and good reputation of Colgate-Palmolive did not tarnish the
magazine's mark, and the court said as much in its opinion.2 9 Us-
ing the court's own words, the publisher's anti-dilution claim fails
the test.130 Had this court used such a test, it could have still prop-
erly denied relief without misconstruing the statute.
2. Sears v. Allstate Driving School
Since 1926, Sears, Roebuck and Company has used ALL-
STATE as a trademark, first on tires, and by the time of this case,
1969, on over 4,000 auto accessories as well as insurance.' 1 With
respect to insurance, Allstate Insurance had offered discounts on
premiums to young persons successfully completing driver-educa-
125. 144 U.S.P.Q. 371.
126. Id. at 374.
127. Id. at 375.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 373-74.
130. Id. at 374: "[Colgate's advertising) attaches no unpleasantness to the
name 'Cue' and cannot by the farthest stretch of the imagination be repugnant to
or have a deleterious effect upon plaintiffs's business in the publication of its
magazine."
131. 301 F. Supp. 4.
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tion courses.1 32 Consequently, when a small driving school adopted
the name "Allstate Driving School," Sears sued to enjoin the use of
its mark. On the basis that there was no likelihood of confusion, no
intentional deception, no direct competition, and no intent by All-
state Insurance to enter the driving school market, the court de-
nied relief.1 33 Unfortunately, the court dismissed the dilution claim
noting the statutory language which stated confusion was not a
prerequisite for dilution but nonetheless asserting that, on the ba-
sis of prior case law, likelihood of confusion was a prerequisite to
dilution." Had the proposed test been available, the court could
have reached the same result without misinterpreting the dilution
doctrine. Consider the elements. First, ALLSTATE has a definite
secondary meaning in the marketplace; 35 nevertheless, it is a weak
mark in that it is made up of two simple words and was being used
at the time of trial by at least 103 other unconnected users.'"9
Weak marks are not candidates for dilution protection. Second,
the goods are technically noncompetitive, but all definitely fall
within the overall automobile marketplace. Marks on goods in sim-
ilar or competitive classes deserve protection under the confusion
doctrine rather than the dilution doctrine. Third, there is no likeli-
hood of immediate injury. This element favors dilution analysis.
Fourth, Sears had used the name ALLSTATE on over 4,000
items; '7 such line extension does not favor granting anti-dilution
protection to the extending party. The difference in the quality of
the goods is not apparent from the facts given. Finally, because
both users used ALLSTATE in the automotive context, the public
might have assumed emanation of both from the same or a related
source. The possibility of related sources points toward confusion
analysis rather than dilution analysis. Thus, this case can be de-
cided on confusion grounds-as indeed it was-and the dilution
claim can be properly dismissed without unnecessary distortion of
the concept.
132. Id. at 9.
133. Id. at 19.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 11.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 6.
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3. Esquire v. Esquire Slipper and Kent v. Lorillard
These two cases'36 are often cited in support of the dilution-
requires-confusion construction of the New York anti-dilution stat-
ute. Courts, however, misapply these cases (both were decided
before the statute was adopted). They may have represented the
common law at one time, but once the legislature spoke, the courts
should have begun construing the doctrine in the manner the legis-
lature intended. In short, pre-1961 cases should not be used to con-
strue the statute.
Nevertheless, both cases press dilution claims, and both can be
properly analyzed using the proposed test to show that neither
court needed to misapply the doctrine in order to reach a proper
decision. In the Esquire case,' 39 the men's magazine tried to enjoin
a sliper manufacturer from using the ESQUIRE mark. The court
denied the injunction, supporting its decision with evidence of
5,000 other commercial uses of ESQUIRE throughout the coun-
try" and finding that the word had some English-language mean-
ing, even if an obscure one. Unfortunately, the court dismissed the
dilution claim on the basis of lack of confusion. The proposed test
shows that the dilution claim was properly dismissed, but not for
lack of any likelihood-of-confusion.' 41 Rather, the weakness of the
mark (5,000 other users) 4 2 and its lack of distinctiveness (diction-
ary word) should have ended the dilution inquiry without damag-
ing the proper concept of the doctrine.
The Kent case14 is more interesting in that any trademark
identity in the United States enjoyed by the senior user no longer
exists. "Kent" was an English family name used on that family's
line of high-quality grooming brushes." 4 In 1952, Lorillard intro-
duced a new cigarette line bearing the KENT trademark, and the
senior user sued to enjoin use of its mark. 145 The court conceded
that the senior user enjoyed a world-wide reputation and substan-
tial good-will and that its mark had acquired a secondary meaning
as to its products.4 6 Nevertheless, the court denied relief, pointing
138. 109 U.S.P.Q. 30; 114 F. Supp. 621.
139. 109 U.S.P.Q. 30.
140. Id. at 32.
141. Id. at 33.
142. Id. at 32.
143. 114 F. Supp. 621.
144. Id. at 623.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 624.
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first to the Patent and Trademark Office's refusal to register the
mark because it was primarily a surname, 1 7 and second to the
large amount of money Lorillard had spent introducing the name,
presumably because it was not well-recognized. 4 8 The first argu-
ment is valid enough, but the second seems to imply that a junior
user can prove that a senior user's mark is weak simply by spend-
ing large amounts of money promoting junior use of the mark. Fi-
nally, the court started the dilution-requires-confusion trend by
looking at Learned Hand's pro-dilution argument in Yale Elec-
tric14' and connecting it to Hand's use of confusion language in the
same case. 160 As stated earlier, today's courts should recognize that
early cases granting anti-dilution relief generally used confusion-
type language in order to fit this new equitable remedy into ac-
cepted legal terms."15
Did G.B. Kent & Sons deserve anti-dilution protection? The
court's concession that KENT had strong secondary meaning, a
world-wide reputation, and substantial goodwill all favored protec-
tion."' Likewise, the goods were noncompetitive, G.B. Kent could
expect little immediate injury, and few purchasers would expect
that the brushes and the cigarettes came from a related source.
Finally, G. B. Kent appears to have used its name properly with no
evidence of overly broad line extensions. Disfavoring anti-dilution
protection were the lack of distinctiveness of the mark-Kent is a
surname registered 30 times"-and the higher level markets at
which both products were aimed; i.e., high-quality items do not di-
lute each other's marks. Thus, using the proposed test, the Kent
case falls just short of deserving protection.
IV. WHY NORTH CAROLINA SHOULD ADOPT SECTION 12 OF THE
MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL
Trademark owners deserve protection from dilution for the
same reasons they deserve protection from the likelihood of confu-
sion, palming-off,"" or outright fraud; these are all methods of un-
147. Id. at 625.
148. Id. at 626.
149. 26 F.2d 972.
150. 114 F. Supp. 621.
151. See supra text p. 184.
152. 114 F. Supp. 621, 624.
153. Id. at 628.
154. 1 J. McCARmTH, supra note 2, § 2:4.
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fairly appropriating the property of another. This discussion does
not purport to provide a detailed analysis of why trademarks de-
serve protection, but the main points can be covered succinctly.
Trademark rights reflect a balance between the need to stifle un-
fair competition and the desire to encourage useful competition. 5
Use of another's trademark can be a lie, and any resulting sale
could be considered a theft. On the other hand, merchants should
not be allowed to monopolize the language, thereby avoiding mar-
ket competition.1 56 Trademark law attempts to strike the proper
balance by superimposing ethical norms onto competitive market
practices."" Furthermore, a trademark is a property right and an
invasion of that right requires a remedy. " A trademark symbol-
izes goodwill,' and goodwill has tangible value to a business-
man.1 60 Consequently, an invasion of the mark can cause financial
damage to the owner, and the fact that fixing the value of such
damage can be difficult does not imply that a wrong has not taken
place. 61
The trademark owner is not the only one to suffer from an
invasion of trademark rights. A trademark is a symbol that says
something about a product, and the consumer has the right to hear
the truth.162 The buyer may vote for a president once every four
years, but in the marketplace, he votes for trademarks almost
daily.11 3 Proper enforcement of trademark rights is in the con-
sumer's best interest.
More specifically, granting that producers and consumers both
deserve trademark protection, why in the presence of the federal
system should state statutory law cover trademark remedies?
North Carolina's present governor has campaigned extensively to
foster desirable economic growth in the state."" If trademarks re-
ceive proper protection in North Carolina-as opposed to improper
155. Id. at § 2:1.
156. 2 id. at § 24:16.
157. 1 id. at § 2:4.
158. Id. at § 2:6.
159. Id. at §§ 2:7-8.
160. Id. at § 2:7.
161. See, e.g. Pipkin v. Thomas & Hill, Inc., 33 N.C. App. 710, 36 S.E.2d
725 (1977).
162. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2:13.
163. Lunsford, supra note 50, at 90.
164. See, e.g., The News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 15, 1976 at 7,
col. 2; March 12, 1977 at 12, col. 1.
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protection elsewhere-the mark owner receives an economic bene-
fit not available elsewhere. The value of a trademark to its owner is
usually buried in the "other assets" column of the annual report,
but as long ago as 1967, the COCA-COLA and COKE marks were
valued at $3 billion.1" As far back as the 1950s, marks such as
MAXWELL HOUSE and JELL-O were worth $42 million and $35
million, respectively. 166 The Lanham Act provides no anti-dilution
protection to marks of such value.167 Consequently, any state offer-
ing anti-dilution protection to the owner of a valuable mark pro-
vides that owner with greater incentive to do business in that state.
If North Carolina desires to attract new business from outside the
state, broader legitimate trademark protection than is available
elsewhere or currently available here is a factor to be considered.
A second reason for state anti-dilution protection is the limita-
tion of Lanham Act registration and protection to marks used in
interstate commerce. 1" Consequently, businesses operating solely
intrastate receive only common-law and state statutory protection.
Local marks can be strong within given geographical boundaries, as
has long been recognized by the Supreme Court.1" What if a brew-
ery decided to become "The Best Beer in the Neighborhood"; or a
jeweler invited gem purchasers to "Take A Closer Look"; or a com-
puter company tried to sell you "Your Personal Thinker"?17 0 Ab-
sent confusion or attempt to defraud-and these are almost always
absent when the goods fall into widely different categories-the
owners of such slogans presently have no way to prevent the inevi-
table degradation of these currently strong local marks should such
unauthorized use arise.
Most of the Model State Trademark Bill has already been
adopted in North Carolina. 711 Similarly, North Carolina courts
have recognized key doctrines of trademark law such as passing
165. Lunsford, supra note 54, at 81.
166. Id. at 82.
167. 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:13.
168. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1976) (Lanham Act).
169. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Hano-
ver Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
170. In North Carolina, North Carolina National Bank advertises itself as
wanting to be "The Best Bank in the Neighborhood," "First Union Bank invites
its customers to "Take a Closer Look," and Wachovia Bank has asked to become
the consumer's Personal Banker.
171. N.C. GaN. STAT. §§ 80-14 (1981).
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off, 172 consumer association of trade name and product quality,17 3
distinctiveness of marks (or the lack thereof),17 4 the unfair nature
of intentional confusion, 17  and the acknowledgement that unfair
competition "takes as many forms as the ingenuity of man can de-
vise." 76 This last factor is most important. It reflects the North
Carolina court's perception that unfair competition cannot always
be classified into previously labelled categories before the court can
grant relief.
North Carolina's addition of Section 12 of the Model Bill to its
current statutory and case law would protect strong local marks,
encourage businesses owning valuable trademarks to locate in the
state, and most importantly, provide a form of trademark protec-
tion that all mark owners-local or national, registered or unregis-
tered-have long deserved. The proposed test would assist North
Carolina courts when faced with a Section 12 case.
V. CONCLUSION
Trademark dilution is an injury distinct from the traditional
wrongs of confusion, palming off, or fraud. This distinction, how-
ever, should not prevent courts from granting relief to deserving
mark owners. The proposed short test provides courts with seven
guidelines with which to decide whether a dilution question has
been presented, and if so, how it should be decided. The test pro-
vides results identical to those reached in all the leading decisions
and does so without misstating the rationale of the doctrine. The
test can provide for clear analysis of trademark cases that do not
fall readily into other categories.
Finally, if North Carolina wishes to foster a favorable business
climate, proper protection of valid trademarks is an important ele-
ment. Logically, successful companies with valuable marks are the
type of industry any area would wish to attract, and a legislative
commitment towards protecting such marks will give more than lip
172. Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 38 N.C. App. 393, 248 S.E.2d
739 (1978).
173. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distributors of North Wilkesboro, Inc., 285
N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
174. Charcoal Steak House of Charlotte, Inc. v. Staley, 263 N.C. 199, 139
S.E.2d 185 (1964).
175. Id. at 203, 139 S.E.2d at 188.
176. Carolina Aniline & Extract Co. v. Ray, 221 N.C. 269, 20 S.E.2d 59
(1942).
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service to this state's desire to become a magnet for developing
industries.
Philip Summa
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